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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

ANTHONY ZINNERMAN,

Case No. 20000012-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree
or capital felony offense. Appellant Anthony Zinnerman was convicted of unlawfully
distributing, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled
substance, a second degree felony offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1998), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance or counterfeit
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony offense, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1998). The judgment is in the record on appeal
("R.") at 135-136, and is attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether Zinnerman was denied a
fair trial when the prosecutor specifically questioned him about his criminal record in

front of the jury after the trial judge had previously ruled that such evidence was
inadmissible.
Standard of Review: "[I]f a trial court has applied the correct legal standard, it has
broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a new trial." State v. Martin. 1999
UT 72 ^[ 5, 984 P.2d 975. In determining whether a prosecutor's deliberate misconduct
has deprived a defendant of a fair trial sufficient to warrant a new trial, this Court will
apply a two-part test:
[The test examines whether] '"[I] [tjhe actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result'"
[for the defendant].
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d
750, 754 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); State v. Trov. 688 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1984).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue is preserved in the record on appeal at 140-41, 177.
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provision will be determinative of the issue on appeal:
UtahR.Crim.P.24(1999).
The text of that provision is contained in the attached Addendum B.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below.
On July 31, 1998, the state charged Appellant/Defendant Anthony Zinnerman
with two second degree felony offenses: Unlawfully distributing, offering, agreeing,
consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, and unlawful
possession of a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute. (R. 13-14.)
On May 20, 1999, the lower court commenced the trial in this matter. On May 21,
1999, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty with respect to both counts. (R. 130-31.) The
judge sentenced Zinnerman to two concurrent prison terms of 1 to 15 years. (R. 135-36.)
Zinnerman is incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. OFFICERS ENGAGED IN AN UNDERCOVER DRUG OPERATION IN
MAY 1998.
On May 22, 1998, Detectives Johnson and Roberts were involved in an
undercover drug operation near Pioneer Park in Salt Lake City. (R. 175:6-9, 110.) As
they drove through an area that is known for drug trafficking, Roberts held money up
toward the windshield to indicate an interest in a drug deal. (R. 175:9, 111.)
If somebody is trafficking narcotics and they see that, if they're interested in a
drug transaction, they'll normally give you a nod or they'll wave you with their
arm to come over to make contact.
(R. 175:9.) LaVon Brown nodded to the detectives and waved them over, indicating the
"beginnings of a drug transaction." (R. 175:10-12, 111.)
3

When the detectives pulled up to Brown, they asked if he had any "coca" or
"cheeva," street terms for cocaine and heroin. (R. 175:12.) Brown asked the detectives if
they were police. When they responded they were not, Brown motioned for them to "pull
in." (R. 175:12-13.)
The detectives were uneasy with Brown's request. Johnson told Brown he would
circle the block and be right back. (R. 175:13, 112.) Johnson wanted to advise the takedown unit of the plan without alerting Brown to the communication. (Id.)
When Johnson and Roberts returned, they asked Brown again for cocaine or
cheeva. (R. 175:15.) Brown asked to see Johnson's paraphernalia to assess whether he
was legitimate. (R. 175:15-16.) When Johnson explained that he "snorted" cocaine and
was checking into the heroin for a friend, Brown told the detectives to hold on. Brown
walked back some distance and made contact with a second man, who officers described
as approximately 63" and intimidating (referred to herein as the "second suspect"). (R.
175:16,113.)
Johnson observed the second suspect take a quantity of what he believed to be
drugs from a bag and hand it to Brown. (R. 175:18, 114.) Brown returned to the
officers, gave the bag to Roberts, and Roberts handed the money to Brown. (R. 175:19,
115.)
As Johnson drove away, he observed Brown and the second suspect get into a car.
Johnson relayed the information to the take-down team, which included Detective Jason
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Mazuran. (R. 175:24-25, 85-86, 117.) Mazuran pulled the car over to arrest Brown and
the second suspect, while Johnson circled the area. Johnson and Roberts returned to the
area and identified the suspects. During a search of the second suspect, officers found
additional drugs. (R. 175:27, 118.)
After the arrest, both men were released in order that they could work with
detectives in locating a drug supplier. (R. 175:41.) After approximately an hour and a
half, when detectives could not make contact with a supplier (R. 175:42), Johnson
provided his telephone number to the second suspect. (R. 175:43.) Thereafter, for the
next month, Johnson received one or two phone messages from the second suspect. (R.
175:43, 68.)
B. THE OFFICERS DESCRIBED A SCAR ON THE SECOND SUSPECT'S
ABDOMEN.
Mazuran, Johnson and Roberts identified Zinnerman at trial as the second suspect
in the drug transaction. (R. 175:17, 22, 26-27, 90, 116.) The state's rebuttal witness,
Detective Carr, also identified Zinnerman. (R. 176:197.) The officers each testified they
observed a scar on the second suspect's stomach at the time of the search incident to
arrest. (R. 175:38,71,91-92, 118-19; 176:197.) Zinnerman had a scar on his abdomen;
the officers identified Zinnerman9 s scar as belonging to the suspect based on a
photograph presented at trial. (R. 175:38-39; 176:197.)
C. EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT OFFICERS DID NOT CONFIRM THE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE SECOND SUSPECT DURING THE INCIDENT,
AND THEY DID NOT MAKE SPECIFIC NOTES CONCERNING HIM.
5

Johnson testified he did not review or confirm identification information
concerning the second suspect at the time of the incident, and he did not photograph him
or take him to jail. (R. 175:51, 62, 72.) Johnson testified that when he prepared his
report in connection with the case, there was a discrepancy as to whether the second
suspect was "Zinnerman" or "Zimmerman." (R. 175:50.) Also, Johnson testified that he
did not note in his report that the second suspect had a scar; rather, he testified to that fact
for the first time at the preliminary hearing. (R. 175:71.)
Johnson's report identified the suspect as Zinnerman, date of birth, height, weight,
and that he was from South Carolina. (R. 175:49-50.) Johnson did not get such
information from the second suspect. (R. 175:51.) In addition, Johnson did not "run" or
generate the report that reflected such information. (R. 175:51.) Likewise, he did not
run a standard driver's license check on either individual. (R. 175:61.)
When Johnson turned the case over to the district attorney, there was an issue
concerning the identification of the second suspect, where the assistant district attorney
may have requested a photo identification for the person who allegedly was involved in
the May 22 drug transaction. (R. 175:69.) Since officers failed to maintain identification
information, they could not provide assistance. (R. 175:70.)
Mazuran and Carr each testified they did not prepare a report in connection with
the incident. (R. 175:96; 176:199.) Also, Mazuran did not obtain or investigate
identification information relating to the suspects. (R. 175:99, 101.)
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Roberts claimed that the physical difference between Brown and the second
suspect, who were both black, was that the second suspect was taller. (R. 175:131.)
Roberts also testified that he conducted the search on the second suspect. He did not
make note of a scar on the second suspect's stomach. (R. 175:132.) Roberts claimed that
the scar was not an important detail to him in part because it was similar to the surgical,
appendectomy scar that Roberts had. (See R. 175:132, 118-19.) Roberts did not
consider the scar to be an important feature or detail, apparently because it was not
uncommon. (SeeR. 175:119, 132.)
Roberts testified that he reviewed an identification card briefly. He "assume[d]" it
belonged to defendant but could not specifically recall. (R. 175:133-34.)
Through cross-examination, the defense was able to present evidence that the
officers did not confirm the identity of the second suspect at the time of the incident,
there was confusion with respect to his name, they did not note details about his features,
and they did not mention that the second suspect had a scar on his stomach. Rather,
officers reported such information later. Also, specific information about Zinnerman
would have been available to officers at a later date. (See R. 176:176-77.)
D. ZINNERMAN TESTIFIED THAT ON MAY 22. HE WAS AT A
BARBECUE: ALSO. AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE OBSERVED THE
SCAR ON HIS ABDOMEN WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED IN NOVEMBER
1998.
Zinnerman denied involvement in the drug transaction on May 22, 1998. (R.
176:168, 177.) He testified that he attended a barbecue with friends, including Rudolph
7

Martin, on that day. (R. 176:170.) Rudolph Martin offered corroborating testimony to
support that on May 22, Zinnerman was not at Pioneer Park; Zinnerman was at a
barbecue with friends most of the day. (R. 176:204-06.)
Zinnerman was arrested in November 1998 for the offenses in this case. He was
required to remove his clothing at the jail. (R. 176:176-77.) State agents would have
observed a scar on Zinnerman's abdomen prior to the state's presentation of testimony
from officers concerning a scar on the second suspect's stomach. (R. 176:176-77.)
E. ZINNERMAN REQUESTED SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE RELATING
TO HIS PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD: ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT
GRANTED THE REQUEST. THE PROSECUTOR ASKED ABOUT
ZINNERMAN'S CRIMINAL BACKGROUND AT TRIAL.
Before trial, counsel for the defense moved to suppress evidence concerning
Zinnerman's criminal history and prior bad acts. (R. 61-62.) The trial judge granted the
motion, stating that with respect to evidence of prior crimes, "I'm not going to allow it to
be brought up." (R. 175:35.) The court further explained that such evidence "would
only be admissible, I guess, if he gets up there and says he's never been convicted of a
felony or something like that." (R. 175:35.)
On the second day of trial, Zinnerman testified. During direct examination, he
was not asked about a criminal history or prior felony offenses. (R. 176:168-78.) On
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, "Mr. Zinnerman, have you previously been
convicted of a felony?" (R. 176:190.) The prosecutor acknowledged that in connection
with asking that question, he was in possession of a certified copy of a sentence/judg8

ment/order reflecting a previous conviction, and he referred to the piece of paper during
that particular portion of the examination. (R. 146, 149.) In response, "Defendant did
not answer the question." (R. 147.)
Thereafter, counsel for the defense objected to the question. The trial judge
instructed the jury that the question was improper and to "disregard" it. (R. 176:190.)
The defense moved for a new trial as a result of the prosecutorial misconduct. (R. 14041.) The trial court denied the motion. (R. 157-58.) On appeal, Zinnerman is
challenging the trial court's ruling on the motion for a new trial.
Additional facts relevant to the issue on appeal are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prior to the trial in this case, the defense moved to have evidence of Zinnerman's
alleged, prior criminal record suppressed. The trial judge granted the motion and stated
that such evidence would only be permitted under limited circumstances. Thereafter, in
violation of the court's order, the prosecutor specifically asked Zinnerman about his
criminal record, apparently in an effort either to get Zinnerman to admit that such a
record existed, or to deny it in order that the prosecutor could introduce the specifics of
the alleged record into evidence. The defense objected to the question, and the judge
ordered that it be stricken.
On appeal, Zinnerman maintains that the improper question called the jury's
attention to matters the jury would not be justified in considering. Although the judge
instructed the jury to disregard the question, the jury was left with the impression that the
9

defense had something to hide with respect to Zinnerman's criminal history. A curative
instruction provided to the jury was insufficient to obviate prejudicial error.
In addition, under the circumstances of this particular case, there was a probability
that the jurors were influenced by the prosecutor's remarks. The case at trial hinged on
the credibility of witnesses. Four police officers testified they observed the second
suspect involved in a drug transaction on May 22, 1998. The officers identified
Zinnerman as the second suspect. Yet, they acknowledged they did not take
identification information from the second suspect; they did not note any distinguishing
characteristic about the second suspect at the time of the incident; and there was some
confusion as to whether the second suspect was "Zinnerman" or "Zimmerman." When
it was determined weeks later that Zinnerman should be arrested for the offense, state
agents would have observed a scar on his stomach that officers later testified belonged to
the second suspect. The defense elicited testimony from officers that may have placed
their credibility in issue. Also, the defense presented evidence that Zinnerman was not
involved in the transaction. Thus, where the jury was required to resolve credibility
issues, the jury may have been influenced by the suggestion from the prosecution that
Zinnerman had a criminal history.
ARGUMENT
ZINNERMAN IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL WHERE THE
PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT,
The prosecutor in this case committed deliberate misconduct. He asked Zinnerman
10

about his criminal background after the judge had ruled that such questions would not be
allowed unless Zinnerman took the witness stand and said "he's never been convicted of
a felony or something like that" (SeeR. 176:190; 175:35.) As a result of the
misconduct, Zinnerman requested a new trial pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Rule 24 provides that a defendant may be entitled to a new trial "if there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."
Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (1999). A trial court has discretion under Rule 24 to grant a new
trial, and an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it appears the
trial court has abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. See State v. Smith,
776 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1989); see also State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah
1998) (quoting State v. Hav. 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993); other cites omitted).
Prosecutorial misconduct may be grounds for a new trial. See State v. Owens,
753 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1988).
In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has deprived defendant of a fair
trial, Utah appellate courts have applied a two-part test:
[This test examines whether] '"[I] [t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result.'"
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d

11

750, 754 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); State v. Trov. 688 P.2d
483,486 (Utah 1984). The first step is "clearly met" when the prosecutor has violated
the court's order restricting the scope of the prosecutor's examination of a witness. State
v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991). The second part of the test is "more difficult."
Id. It refers to the prejudice analysis. "If the prejudice is such that there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable result absent the comments, we
will reverse." State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997). As set forth below,
Zinnerman has met both parts of the test.
A. THE PROSECUTOR SPECIFICALLY ASKED ABOUT ZINNERMAN'S
CRIMINAL HISTORY AFTER THE TRIAL COURT RULED SUCH AN
INQUIRY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED.
Applying the first part of the test, the prosecutor called the attention of jurors to
matters they were not justified in considering.
Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence of defendant's
alleged criminal background and bad acts, pursuant to Rules 609(a)(1) and 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence. (R. 61-62.) The motion apparently related to three prior alleged
offenses: aggravated assault, battery and "false information."1 (R. 175:35.)
Pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of prior crimes is
presumed prejudicial. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985) (interpreting

l Under Utah statutory law, a person is guilty of a misdemeanor offense if he provides
false information to any peace officer. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506 (1999).
12

earlier version of rule). It shall be admitted only if the court determines "that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused."
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) (1999); see Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741 (under prior version of
rule, party seeking to introduce such evidence must show some reason other than
criminal disposition); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989); State v. Lanier, 778
P.2d 9, 10 (Utah 1989); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986).
In addition, Rule 404(b) provides that "evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith." The rule specifies the circumstances under which evidence relating to such
acts may be admissible. Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (1999).
In this matter, during a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor
claimed he had certified documents to support the fact that Zinnerman pled guilty to
certain offenses. (R. 175:35.) The documents are not contained in the file and were not
offered into evidence by the prosecutor. The prosecutor's statements were insufficient to
constitute evidence of the facts asserted. See State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 n.l
(Utah App. 1998) (party has duty to support allegations with adequate record). In
addition, the prosecutor did not allege that circumstances existed in this case to allow the
presentation of the evidence under Rule 609 or 404(b). (See R. 175:35); Banner, 717
P.2d at 1334 ("Mr. Gunnarson offered no evidence that introduction of the convictions
was more probative than prejudicial").
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Thus, the judge granted the motion to suppress and ruled that evidence concerning
Zinnerman's criminal background could not "be brought up." (R. 175.35.) The trial
judge also stated that evidence relating to the alleged aggravated assault offense "would
only be admissible, I guess, if he gets up there and says he's never been convicted of a
felony or something like that." (R. 175:35.)
On the second day of trial, Zinnerman testified. During cross-examination, the
prosecutor asked the following question: "Mr. Zinnerman, have you previously been
convicted of a felony?" (R. 176:190.) The prosecutor acknowledged that he held a
"docket at the podium as the question was asked." (R. 149.) Zinnerman "did not answer
the question." (R. 147.) Thereafter, counsel for the defense objected, and the trial judge
instructed the jury to disregard the question. (R. 176:190.)
The prosecutor's question called the jury's attention to matters the jury was not
allowed to consider. Utah R. Evid. 404(b); 609(a)(1) (1999). Pursuant to Rule 3.4(e),
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may not allude to any matter "that the
lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence." See Troy. 688 P.2d at 486-87 (counsel is obligated to avoid any reference to
matters the jury is not justified in considering; also, prosecutor's question concerning
defendant's criminal background was an improper attempt to bias the jury).
The question was an attempt by the prosecutor to create an impression in the
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minds of jury members that Zinnerman was a bad person, and should not be believed
because he had a criminal background. Since the prosecutor had plain directions from
the trial judge that the information concerning Zinnerman's alleged criminal record was
inadmissible, it was improper for the prosecutor to allude to such matters. Span, 819
P.2d at 335. Zinnerman has met the first prong in establishing that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial for prosecutorial misconduct.
See Basta, 966 P.2d at 268.
B. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. THE ERROR WAS
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL REQUIRING REVERSAL.
A prosecutor's misconduct constitutes reversible error when the error is
"substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence,
there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Hay, 859 P.2d
1, 6 (Utah 1993) (cites omitted); State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998);
Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352; Trov, 688 P.2d at 486-87; see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1224 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400,403 (Utah 1986)).
When the prosecutor improperly suggests to the jury that defendant has a sordid or
criminal background, that suggestion may have an enormous impact on defendant's case.
Such an error is substantial. Whether the defendant responds to the suggestion or
remains silent is irrelevant. The effect is devastating either way: The jury either learns
about the criminal past, or the jury is left with the impression that defendant has
something to hide in refusing to answer the question.
15

The improper question presents the jury with an opportunity to assume the
defendant is a bad person, is probably guilty of the crime at issue because he has
committed past crimes, or has something to hide about a criminal past. "The deep
tendency of human nature to punish not because [the defendant] is guilty this time but
because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught is a
tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court." 1 A.J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 57 at 1185 (Tillers rev. 1983). "The insinuation that other evidence exists
encourages the jury to determine its verdict based upon evidence outside the record and
jeopardizes a defendant's right to a trial based upon the evidence presented." State v.
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993).
In this case, the prosecutor's question about Zinnerman's criminal background
constituted substantial error. The prosecutor likely was aware that the question presented
a "trilemma." See American Fork v. Cosgrove. 701 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1985)
(recognizing the "cruel trilemma" that existed in English ecclesiastical courts when the
defendant was required to answer all questions directed to him). Once the question was
out, Zinnerman could acknowledge an alleged conviction for a felony offense; he could
deny the matter, thereby opening the door for the prosecution to present evidence of
Zinnerman's alleged criminal past; or he could refuse to answer the question, thereby
leaving the jury to believe he had something to hide.
Even though Zinnerman did not answer the question, the suggestion of a criminal

16

background may have added critical weight to the prosecutor's case, while Zinnerman
was powerless to dispute it. Zinnerman could not dispute the implication left by the
question without opening the door to the presentation of more information by the
prosecutor. The misconduct constituted substantial error.
The error also was prejudicial. Utah appellate courts have ruled that prosecutorial
misconduct is prejudicial when it is directed at the defendant, when the misconduct
relates to an issue that the jury must decide, when the jury is presented with a case that
involves credibility issues surrounding the witnesses, and when the state has failed to
offer nontestimonial evidence to support its witnesses' version of the events. See Troy,
688 P.2d at 486; State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App. 1997).
In Troy, 688 P.2d at 486, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he referred
to defendant's alias and residential situation under a federal identity, when he asked
about defendant's "various criminal matters," and when he compared the defendant to
criminals who have "all kinds of irrational behavior ... Hinckley is a classic example."
Id. Since the misconduct was directed at the defendant, the supreme court determined
the error was "qualitatively different" from misconduct directed at other witnesses: The
jury was more likely to be influenced by the misconduct. Span, 819 P.2d at 335 (in cases
where conduct is directed at defendant, court is more inclined to find that jury may have
been unduly influenced by the prosecutorial misconduct); see also State v. WiswelL 639
P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981); Bvrd. 937 P.2d at 536; State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293,
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1297 (Utah App. 1997). In this matter, the improper question concerning the criminal
history was directed at Zinnerman. The prosecutor specifically intended to discredit
Zinnerman to the jury or make him look like a bad person.
Utah appellate courts also have recognized that under the prejudice analysis,
prosecutorial misconduct is more likely to unduly influence the jury when the jury is
presented with conflicting evidence and is required to resolve credibility issues. Troy,
688 P.2d at 486. To that end, the court may consider the circumstantial nature of the
state's evidence and the defendant's case. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787
(Utah App. 1991) (prejudice analysis compares impact of prosecutorial misconduct, other
evidence of guilt and evidence that may absolve defendant of crime).
"Courts have generally refused[] to conclude that evidence was overwhelming in
cases that ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence, particularly
where the defendant's credibility is involved." Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536; State v.
Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986) ("When the evidence in the record is
circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced by an
improper argument"). "If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing
conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed,
in such cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the
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evidence. They may be susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be
sufficient to affect the verdict." Trov, 688 P.2d at 486; Andreason, 718 P.2d at 403.
In this case, the pivotal issues concerned the identification of the second suspect
and the credibility of the witnesses. While four officers testified that Zinnerman was the
second suspect, they also testified that on May 22, they failed to confirm information
concerning the second suspect's identity; they did not prepare reports regarding the
matter (R. 175:96 (Mazuran did not prepare report); 176:199 (Carr did not prepare
report)); and/or they did not note anything particular about the second suspect. (See R.
175:71 (Johnson did not indicate existence of a scar until preliminary hearing); 175:12425 (Roberts searched second suspect at the time of the incident and did not note scar).)
In addition, there was a question as to whether the second suspect was "Zinnerman" or
"Zimmerman." (R. 175:49-50,69-70.)
The evidence supports that officers did not gather information about the second
suspect during the incident; rather, they collected information about Zinnerman at a later
date. The officers may have learned about the scar in November 1998 when Zinnerman
was arrested, months after the alleged incident but prior to officers testifying in the case.
(R. 176:176 (Zinnerman arrested in November 1998 and required to remove clothing,
revealing scar); 175:71 (Johnson first indicated the existence of a scar at preliminary
hearing in February 1999).) The crux of Zinnerman's case was that the officers had the
wrong person; they let the second suspect get away. Since officers did not know the
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second suspect, they learned enough about Zinnerman later through other sources to
provide specific testimony that he was the suspect.
Zinnerman presented evidence at trial that he was not the second suspect. He
testified that he did not know the officers, he was not in the area of Pioneer Park on May
22, and he was not involved in the drug transaction. (R. 176:168, 170, 177.) Rudolph
Martin presented corroborating testimony as to Zinnerman's whereabouts on May 22.
(R. 176:204-06.) Zinnerman's "credibility before the jury was crucial to his defense."
Aesoph v. State. 721 P.2d 379, 383 (Nev. 1986). Because the state and Zinnerman
offered conflicting versions of the events surrounding the drug transaction, the case came
down to the word of the defense against the word of the state's witnesses. See Byrd 937
P.2dat536. The jury "could have found either way." Troy, 688 P.2d at 487. Evidence
presented by the defense would have absolved Zinnerman of the crime. Under these
circumstances, the evidence against Zinnerman was not so overwhelming as to overcome
the prejudice that existed as a result of the prosecutor introducing the suggestion that
Zinnerman had a criminal record or was a bad person.
Finally, the state offered no decisive nontestimonial evidence against Zinnerman.
The evidence consisted only of the officers' testimony where they failed to note details
about the second suspect at the time of the incident. Given the nature of the state's
evidence against Zinnerman, the prosecutorial misconduct tipped the balance against
Zinnerman by suggesting he was either a bad person with a criminal background, or had
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something to hide. Thus, there was a likelihood that jurors would be improperly
influenced by the prosecutor's improper question, which left a negative implication
concerning the defendant. By alluding to a criminal record, the prosecutor may have
caused the jury to convict Zinnerman for who he was and not what he allegedly did.
Zinnerman was prejudiced by the prosecutor's misconduct. The trial court erred in failing
to order a new trial.
C. THE CURATIVE INSTRUCTION WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OBVIATE
THE PREJUDICE.
After the prosecutor asked the improper question, the judge ruled the question
should be stricken and instructed the jury as follows: "Ladies and gentlemen, that's an
improper question to be asked in this court and he's not going to be allowed to ask that
question so disregard the question." (R. 176:190.) The curative instruction was
insufficient to neutralize any damage. Jurors were left to speculate with respect to what
the answer would have been, and may have inflated the importance of the undisclosed
information or the fact that the defense did not answer the question.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that curative instructions "are a settled and
necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which a
court may remedy errors at trial." State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998); see.
also State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 929-30 (Utah App. 1998). The supreme court
also has recognized that curative instructions "are not always sufficient to avoid the
potential prejudice to the defendant. [State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1988)].
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The potential for prejudice is greatest when the circumstantial facts are closely related to
the issue the jury must ultimately decide." State v. WetzeL 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993);
State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37 (Utah 1996) (potential error was obviated with
"sufficiently"correct curative instruction). "This court acknowledges that curative
instructions are not without defect or limitation." Harmon. 956 P.2d at 273 n.9.
In Harmon, the court recognized that curative instructions are not a "cure-all."
Harmon. 956 P.2d at 273. Also, to neutralize the damage of prosecutorial misconduct, a
curative instruction should be prompt, effective, and strong. See id. at 272 (citing U.S. v.
Weitzenhoff. 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] prompt and effective
admonishment of counsel or curative instruction from the trial judge may effectively
'neutralize the damage'") (quoting U.S. v. Simtob. 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990));
U.S. v. Diaz-Carreon. 915 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 1990) (court's strong curative
instruction and condemnation of prosecutor's tactics effectively neutralized damaging
effect of improper prosecutorial remarks)); see also Harmon, 956 P.2d at 278 (Durham,
J., concurring) (there is a significant likelihood that "our collective confidence in the
curative instruction as a valuable 'tool' is not substantiated by reality"); see also State v.
Boyatt 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App. 1993) (no prosecutorial misconduct where trial court
provided complete instruction on the law and directed jury to follow law as stated by
court).
In this case, the curative instruction was not effective. The trial judge ordered the
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jury to disregard the question, but did not inform the jury that it may not speculate as to
whether Zinnerman had a prior felony conviction or criminal background, or as to why
defendant did not respond to the improper question. An appropriate curative instruction
would have explained to the jury that the prosecutor may not ask such questions and,
also, that he is not entitled to the answer; therefore, it would be inappropriate to speculate
one way or the other as to what the answer would have been. Without an effective
curative instruction, the jury was left believing Zinnerman had something to hide, i.e. a
prior felony conviction. See Elliott v. State, 984 S.W.2d 362 (Ark. 1998) (reference to
defendant as habitual criminal cannot be cured); Ex Parte Sparks, 730 So.2d 113 (Ala.
1998) (curative instruction cannot be expected to ameliorate evidence of defendant's
criminal background).
Finally, with respect to the general jury charge, the last sentence in Instruction 29
provided the following: "As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you
must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the
objection." (R. 123.) Such an instruction may have neutralized damage caused by the
prosecutor in asking the improper question if such an instruction had been given when
the misconduct occurred. See U.S. v. Cudlitz. 72 F.3d 992, 1002 (1st Cir. 1996) (a
curative instruction is effective if it is brought in a timely manner); U.S. v. Solivan. 937
F.2dll46, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991): State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929. 933 (Utah App. 1991)
(in response to prosecutor's misstatement, judge promptly called the attention of the jury
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to appropriate written instructions), revM on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).
In this case, Instruction 29 was not provided to the jury in connection with the
misconduct. Rather, the trial court provided Instruction 29 to the jury together with a
packet of 34 written instructions. (See R. 91 (jury instructed at the close of defendant's
case).) It is unlikely the jury made the relationship between Instruction 29 and the
misconduct, particularly where the instruction referred to a "sustained" objection while
the trial judge did not use such language when the misconduct occurred. (Compare R.
123 with R. 176:190.)
The error in this case was not satisfactorily corrected. The curative instruction
and written jury charge were insufficient to overcome the prejudice caused by the
implications raised as a result of the prosecutor's improper question.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Zinnerman respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.
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LINDA M.JONES
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 981914830 FS

ANTHONY ZINNERMAN,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

L. A. DEVER
July 12, 1999

PRESENT
Clerk:
audreyj
Prosecutor: POSTMA, MICHAEL E
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DEBORAH KREECKMENDEZ
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 14, 1967
Video
Tape Number:
video
Tape Count: 12-27-15
CHARGES
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/21/1999 Guilty Plea
2. POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/21/1999 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years m the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
Page 1

Case No: 981914830
Date:
Jul 12, 1999
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison on both counts to run concurrent with each other but
consecutive with any other sentence.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court will stay the imposition of this sentence until the defense
motion for new trial can be heard.

Dated this

$L

day of

Page 2 (last)

i-a.

ADDENDUM B

Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) Amotion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.

